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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appel lee, 
CLAY Y. STARK, 
Defendant/Appel lant. 
Case No. 20010536-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from a judgment and convuMon ',>' iiivin^ mulei 'IK1 miluence 
of alcohoi f Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2001), 
; an open container in a vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code * r.i\ z - <>-44.20 (1998), in the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, the 
Honorable Stanton lylor presiding. sdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. .} "S-2 \ ViMleMSupp 2001J. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1(a): Should thi; inadequate briefing and 
react was ineffective? 
Issue No. 1(b): If this court does address the merits, was trial counsel ineffective 
for: 
(1) not pursuing a motion to suppress evidence that would have been denied 
because defendant's detention and arrest were clearly proper; 
(2) not objecting to the State's allegedly improper notice of expert testimony, even 
though there is no indication that the notice was improper; or 
(3) not objecting to expert testimony that was clearly proper to lay the foundation 
for admission of the results of breath tests performed on defendant? 
Standard of Review: "When, as in this case, the claim of ineffective assistance is 
raised for the first time on appeal, we resolve the issue as a matter of law." State v. 
Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah App. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999) is relevant to resolution of this case. A copy is 
attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 18, 2000, defendant was charged by information with driving under the 
influence of alcohol and having an open container (R. at 1-2). 
Defendant's trial counsel initially requested a suppression hearing, but later 
decided not to pursue a motion to suppress (R. 29, 31). 
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At trial, defendant attacked the veracity of the Intoxilyzer results in part by noting 
that Deputy Talbot's certification in the use of the machine had temporarily lapsed at the 
time he performed the test (R. 116:106-07). 
Jury Instruction No. 28 stated: "The lack of certification of Deputy Talbot and its 
effect or lack of effect upon the test result is an issue to be decided by you." (R. 84). 
On April 18, 2001, a jury convicted defendant on both counts (R. 94-95). He was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of up to five years in prison (R. 100). He timely 
appeals (R. 103). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 14, 2000, Weber County Deputy Sheriff Jason Talbot was on patrol when 
a vehicle sped past him in the opposite direction with a completely flat tire (R. 116:23). 
Because driving on a flat tire is a safety violation - and a safety hazard - the deputy 
turned around intending to pull the vehicle over (R. 116:24). However, by the time he 
reached the vehicle, it had already pulled into a parking lot (id.). 
Deputy Talbot activated his overhead lights and made contact with the defendant, 
who was driving the vehicle (R. 116:25,41). The deputy immediately noticed a "very 
distinct odor of alcohol" on defendant's breath (id.). The deputy also noticed that 
defendant had an open can beer sitting near him (id.). 
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Deputy Talbot asked defendant if he had been dnnking (R. 116:26). Defendant 
"stated that he'd drank all night until 3:00 in the morning" (id.). Defendant also 
acknowledged he had consumed "one or two right before I stopped him" (id.). 
Deputy Talbot asked defendant for his license, but he stated that his license had 
been revoked (R. 116:28). Deputy Talbot then asked defendant if he would perform field 
sobriety tests, but the defendant refused (R. 116:27). Defendant was arrested for 
suspicion of DUI, having an open container and driving on a revoked license (R. 116:28). 
At the jail, Deputy Talbot asked defendant if he would submit to an Intoxilyzer test 
(R. 116:55). Defendant initially refused, but ultimately agreed (id.). The results of the 
tests determined defendant's blood alcohol was .093 - in excess of .08, the level at which 
it is illegal to operate a vehicle (R. 116:60). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First and foremost, this Court should not review defendant's arguments because 
they are inadequately briefed. This Court should reject defendant's arguments because 
they are presented cursorily with little citation to caselaw or to the record. 
If this Court reaches the merits, it should still affirm defendant's conviction 
because he has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was deficient or 
that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiencies. Defendant's claim that his trial 
counsel should have pursued a motion to suppress fails because (1) Deputy Talbot clearly 
had probable cause to effect the traffic stop when he saw defendant driving on a 
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completely flat tire and (2) the deputy had reasonable suspicion to detain and probable 
cause to arrest defendant based on the smell of alcohol, an open container of beer in the 
vehicle, defendant's revoked driver's license and defendant's admission he had been 
drinking. Thus, a motion to suppress evidence would have been pointless. 
Defendant's complaints concerning the testimony of Utah Highway Patrol Trooper 
Scott Hathcock are similarly defective. Defendant's claim that trial counsel should have 
objected to the State's allegedly defective notice of expert testimony fails because the 
record demonstrates that the notice was not defective. Moreover, contrary to defendant's 
argument, Trooper Hathcock's testimony was well within the scope of his expertise. 
ARGUMENT 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must identify acts or 
omissions showing that his trial counsel's performance did not meet "an objective 
standard of reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 
(1984). A defendant must also show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsels]' unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Id. at 694; see also State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1258 (Utah 1993) ("A reasonable 
probability is that which is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the reliability of the 
outcome."). Defendant does not meet either prong of the Strickland test. His conviction 
should therefore be affirmed. 
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I. DEFENDAiYTS ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE 
REJECTED BECAUSE THEY ARE INADEQUATELY 
BRIEFED. 
Defendant's arguments should not be considered by this Court because they are 
inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (an argument "shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including 
the grounds for reviewing an issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 
305 (Utah 1998) (rule 24(a)(9) "requires not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority"), State v. 
Smith, 1999 UT App 370, f 9, 995 P.2d 14 (defendant's brief is so inadequate that it 
"impermissibly shifted the burden of analysis to the reviewing court"). 
Defendant's argument section is scarcely four pages long with little more than 
boiler-plate citations to the standard Strickland line of cases. Aplt. Br. at 7-10. Even 
marginally relevant caselaw is recited cursorily with virtually no attempt to apply the law 
to the facts. Moreover, defendant selectively recites facts to remove portions of Deputy 
Talbot's testimony that he stopped defendant for violating safety regulations by driving 
on a flat tire (R. 116:24). 
Additionally, the analysis defendant provides consists almost entirely of naked 
assertions unsupported by caselaw. For example, defendant states: 
In this matter, the record shows clearly that Mr. Galvez's trial 
strategy was jury nullification asking the jury to disregard the 
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breath test results merely because the officer's certification 
was lapsed at the time he operated the Intoxilyzer.... 
Counsel attempted to compare the lapsed certification to 
practicing law without a license.... 
Aplt. Br. at 8. Defendant provides no citation to cases discussing jury nullification.1 Nor 
does he provide citation or analysis to suggest it is inappropriate or erroneous for trial 
counsel to attack the Intoxylizer results by attacking the officer's certification. 
II. THE PERFORMANCE OF DEFENDANT'S TRIAL 
COUNSEL WAS NOT OBJECTIVELY DEFICIENT. 
A. A Motion to Suppress Would Have Been 
Denied; Thus, Defendant's Trial Counsel 
Cannot be Deficient for Failing to Pursue 
Such a Motion. 
Defendant faults his trial counsel for failing to pursue a motion to suppress 
because Deputy Talbot did not have reasonable suspicion to pull him over. Br. Aplt. at 8-
9. However, given that the traffic stop and subsequent arrest of defendant are 
unassailable under Utah law, trial counsel cannot be faulted for not filing a futile motion. 
It cannot be disputed that Deputy Talbot had reasonable suspicion to stop 
defendant when he saw him driving with a completely flat tire. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann 
1
 In fact, there is little to suggest the strategy of defendant's trial counsel was jury 
nullification. Trial counsel uses the term only once in his opening statement and appears 
to misapprehend it as meaning simply that jurors are the ultimate arbiters of guilt or 
innocence. For example, trial counsel states: 'Tm not asking you to ignore the evidence 
or to say, Oh well, you know, he must not be guilty because of some convoluted thinking 
process.... I'm asking you is the whole testimony by the deputy truthful, consistent, 
necessarily so? Obviously he wasn't certified. You get to decide what that means, what it 
may or may not mean." See R. 116:110. 
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§ 41-6-150(e)( 1998) (*4A person shall not operate any vehicle when one or more of the 
tires in use on that vehicle is in unsafe operating condition . . . " ) ; see also State v. Lopez, 
873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) ("[A]s long as an officer suspects that the 'driver is 
violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the 
police officer may legally stop the vehicle") (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
661 (1979)). While discussing the flat tire with defendant, Deputy Talbot smelled a 
"very distinct odor of alcohol" on defendant's breath (R. 116:24). Further, defendant had 
an open container in his vehicle and admitted he had consumed alcohol (id.). These facts 
gave rise to reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence of 
alcohol. See, e.g., Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah App. 1987) (police 
officer's observations of defendant and odor of alcohol provided reasonable suspicion for 
detention and investigation of DUI). Under these circumstances, the further detention 
and ultimate arrest of defendant was axiomatic. 
Nonetheless, defendant suggests that a motion to suppress could have been filed 
based on Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1992), which held that a police 
officer was justified in performing a "caretaker stop" of a motorist after being informed 
that the driver was contemplating suicide. Warden is inapposite. Deputy Talbot was not 
performing a caretaker stop; rather, he had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car 
because he was driving on a flat tire. 
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In short, because the deputy had reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and the 
continued detention of defendant, a motion to suppress would have been futile. "Failure 
to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. 
Kelley, 2000 UT 41,f 26, 1 P.3d 546. Thus, the decision of defendant's trial counsel 
forego the suppression hearing was not only reasonable, but obligatory. His performance 
was clearly not deficient. 
Additionally, defendant has not met the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. 
Strickland, 466 at 694. Defendant fails to provide any indication as to how his trial 
counsel's alleged deficiencies were harmful or how the result of his trial would have been 
different but for the alleged errors. Although the granting of a motion to suppress would 
likely have changed the outcome of the case, defendant provides no analysis to 
demonstrate the likelihood that such a motion would have succeeded. Thus, even if trial 
counsel had pursued the motion to suppress, the result of the trial would not have been 
different. 
B. The State's Notice to Defendant of Trooper 
Hathcock's Expert Testimony Met the 
Requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1). 
Defendant's next complaint is that his trial attorney should have protested when 
"the State provided defective notice of it's [sic] expert witness, Scott Hathcock . . . " 
because the notice did not contain affidavits concerning the Intoxilyzer device and the 
trooper's vita. Br. Aplt. at 9-10. This claim is baseless. 
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Utah law requires notice of intent to call an expert witness at least 30 days before 
trial. 
If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify 
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held 
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as 
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the 
hearing. . . . Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the 
expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a) & (b). 
On February 20, 2001 - more than 30 days before the April 18, 2001, trial date -
the State provided notice to defendant that it intended to call Trooper Hathcock "to testify 
at trial concerning the certification and proper working order of the Intoxilyzer that was 
used in this case" (R. 44). See copy of State's Notice of Intent to Call Expert Witness, 
dated February 20, 2001, attached as Addendum B. The Notice continues: "Attached also 
find copies of the intoxilyzer affidavits for before and after the date of the test and a copy 
of Trooper Hathcock's Curriculum Vitae." 
As noted, defendant claims neither the affidavits nor Trooper Hathcock's vitae 
were attached to the notice. However, defendant provides nothing to substantiate this 
claim and the record clearly indicates otherwise. Although the Notice filed with the trial 
court does not contain the affidavits and vitae, that does not mean that the documents 
were not provided to counsel. The rule requires "notice to the opposing party," not to the 
court. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1). Absent some indication to the contrary, this 
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Court should assume that the facts comport with the record. State v. Litherland, 2000 LT 
761f 17, 12 P.3d 92 ("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or 
deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that 
counsel performed effectively"); see also Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 
1979) ("Inasmuch as the record fails to indicate anything to the contrary, it is to be 
presumed that the proceedings were carried out in accordance with the requirements of 
law . . . " ) . Moreover, the portions of the trial transcript covering Trooper Hathcock's 
testimony and the introduction of the Intoxilyzer affidavits provide no indication that 
defendant's trial counsel was surprised or unfamiliar with the trooper's credentials or the 
contents of the affidavits (R. 116: 75-78). Thus, defendant's claim that his counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting to inadequate notice of the State's expert is without record 
support and should be rejected. 
Nor has defendant shown any prejudice. If, as defendant claims, the notice of 
expert testimony was improper, the only remedy would have been a continuance. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4). Absent a showing that a later trial would have yielded a 
different result, defendant's claim of prejudice fails.2 
2
 Defendant also purports to argue that Trooper Hathcock "inappropriately 
exceeded the scope of the suggested testimony." Aplt. Br. at 10. This argument is 
presented in four sentences and is clearly inadequately briefed. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
Moreover, a review of Trooper Hathcock's testimony shows it was well within his 
expertise and provided the foundation for admission of the breath tests. Finally, 
defendant provides no indication as to how omitting the allegedly improper testimony of 
Trooper Hathcock would have affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, he has not 
shown error or prejudice and his ineffective assistance claim fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day 1st day of July, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, this 1st day of July, 2002 to: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 





Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 Expert testimony generally -Notice requirements. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a 
felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 
7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party intending to call the expert shall give 
notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or 
ten days before the hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's curriculum 
vitae, and a copy of the expert's report. 
(2) (a) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed 
testimony. 
(b) If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately inform 
concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony including any opinion and 
the bases and reasons of that opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide 
to the opposing party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient 
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a 
copy of any report prepared by the expert when available. 
(3) (a) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party receiving 
notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates 
calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the name and address of any expert 
witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. If available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall 
be provided to the other party. 
(b) If the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately 
inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony, or in the event the 
rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the rebuttal witness shall 
provide a written explanation of the witness's anticipated rebuttal testimony sufficient to 
give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a 
copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal expert when available. 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this 
section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing 
sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad 
faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing 
held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes notice of the 
expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the expert's proposed trial testimony as 
to the subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing shall 
provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as soon as 
practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the expert may be called as art expert 
witness. 
Addendum B 
L. DEAN SAUNDERS, UBN 6324 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2D FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 FEB 2 •: -y? 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLAY Y. STARK, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S NOTICE OF INTENT 
TO CALL EXPERT WITNESS. 
Case No. 001901546 
Judge: STANTON M. TAYLOR 
L. Dean Saunders, Deputy Weber County Attorney by and for the State of Utah, hereby 
gives notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (l)(a) of the States intention to call Scott 
Hathcock, of the Utah Highway Patrol to testify at trial concerning the certification and proper 
working order of the intoxilyzer that was used in this case. Attached also find copies of the 
intoxilyzer affidavits for before and after the date of the test and a copy of Trooper Hathcock's 
Curriculum Vitae. 
Respectfully submitted this 7-0 4r-day of February, 2001. 
DEAN SAUNDERS 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
G4-i 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice was hand delivered 
or mailed, postage pre-paid, to: 
Jorge H. Galvez 
Attorney for Defendant 
155 South 300 West, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DATED this,3P/ft day of January, 2001. 
. ^%wh^^/ii^^ 
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